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Abstract 
In Weitzman (1974) the choice between price and quantity regulation under 
imperfect information is analysed. It is shown that the choice between the two 
regulatory instruments depends on the sign of the sum of the curvatures of the 
cost and benefit functions. If the marginal benefit function is steep and the mar-
ginal cost function is flat quantity regulation is preferred over price regulation, 
while price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation if the marginal bene-
fit function is flat and the marginal cost function is steep. The results in Weitz-
man (1974) are sometimes quoted in studies of fisheries management. In this 
paper an analysis of conditions for generalising the Weitzman result to fisheries 
economics is presented. It is shown that the result can be generalised if the cost 
function is additively separable in stock size and catches. This leads to the con-
clusion that the results hold for a schooling fishery. However, for a search fish-
ery the condition that the cost function must be additively separable is seldom 
fulfilled and quotation of the classical article is therefore not reasonable. A fur-
ther result is that for a schooling fishery, taxes are likely to be preferred over 
individual transferable quotas in the case where there is imperfect information 
about costs. The reason is that the marginal cost function is likely to be steeper 
than the demand function. In the light of this result, the fact that individual quo-
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1. Introduction 
Fisheries economists usually recommend the use of a system of individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) or taxes as the regulatory instruments that secure 
economic efficiency, see Clark (1985). With regard to ITQs, compliance prob-
lems are often mentioned as a problem that obscures reaching a first-best opti-
mum (see Copes (1986)), while taxes have been criticized for posing too big 
information requirements, see Arnason (1990). 
 
The equivalence of transferable permits or quotas and taxes in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency under full information has been shown repeatedly in the pollu-
tion control literature (see Baumol and Oates (1988)) as well as in the fisheries 
economic literature (see Moloney and Pearse (1979)). Furthermore, within the 
pollution control literature there are many analyses of the choice between price 
and quantity regulation under imperfect information. The classic article within 
this area is Weitzman (1974), where it is shown that the choice between price 
and quantity regulation depends on the sign of the sum of the curvatures of the 
benefit and cost functions. If the marginal benefit function is flat and the mar-
ginal cost function is steep, price regulation is preferred over quantity regula-
tion, while quantity regulation is preferred over price regulation if the marginal 
benefit function is steep and the marginal cost function is flat. In this paper a 
brief overview of the pollution control literature is given. 
 
Even though it is well documented in the pollution control literature that the 
equivalence between price and quantity regulation does not hold in the presence 
of imperfect information, it is often not well understood in the literature of fish-
eries management. This can be illustrated by quoting the work of Colin W. 
Clark. Clark (1982) writes: 
 
“The relationship between taxes and quota market prices might be 
clarified in the stochastic setting by modelling the quota market, but 
we shall not pursue the study here (see Weitzman (1974))”. 
  
8
From this it is seen that Colin W. Clark seems to think that the classic analysis 
by Weitzman can be generalised for fisheries economics. Therefore, the pur-
pose of this paper is to analyse conditions for such generalisation to be possible. 
It is shown that it is only possible to generalise Weitzman's results for fisheries 
economics if there is no interaction in the cost function between stock size and 
catches (the cost function is additive separable in stock size and catches).  
 
Within fisheries economics there is a distinction between schooling fisheries 
and search fisheries, see Neher (1990). A schooling fishery can be defined, as a 
fishery for which the fish stock size does not influence the cost of fishing. The 
herring fishery is an example of such a fishery and herring is typically found in 
shoals. A search fishery is defined as a fishery where the fish stock influences 
the cost of fishing. Cod is an example of such a fishery and cod is typically 
spread over a fishery area. For a schooling fishery the condition that the cost 
function must be additively separable in stock size and catches is clearly ful-
filled and therefore the quotation of Weitzman is correct. However, for a search 
fishery the cost function is not likely to be additively separable in stock size and 
catches. Therefore, it is not possible to generalise Weitzman's analysis for a 
search fishery. These results will be shown in section 4 of this paper. 
 
For a s chooling fishery prices tends to be constant, while the marginal cost 
function tends to have a positive slope. Because Weitzman's result do generalise 
for schooling fisheries, the implication is that taxes are preferred over ITQs in 
terms of economic efficiency if the regulatory authority (society) is unsure 
about marginal costs. However, Wilen (2000) mentions that individual quotas 
regulate about 55 fisheries while taxes regulate none. Among schooling fisher-
ies the herring fishery in Iceland is managed by  ITQs, see Arnason and Gis-
surarson (1999). This fact is, as argued in section 4, surprising in the light of the 
analysis in this paper. 
 
In one analysis of the choice between price and quantity regulation under im-
perfect information for fisheries, Weitzman  (2000) studies imperfect informa-
tion about the stock-recruitment relation and shows that taxes are preferred over  
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ITQs in this case.
2 With a tax it is possible to reach the desired escapement 
level for recruiters, while there is no guarantee for this with quantity regulation. 
Weitzman (2000) calls imperfect information about the stock-recruitment rela-
tion “ecological uncertainty”. In this paper economic uncertainty is analysed. 
Economic uncertainty can be defined as uncertainty about the profit function 
and Weitzman (2000) writes: 
 
“Pure economic uncertainty is a typical “price-vs-quantity type” 
mixed situation”. 
 
This implies that the curvatures of the cost and benefit function are important 
for the choice between price and quantity regulation. The result in this paper 
shows that this statement by Weitzman (2000) is imprecise for two reasons. 
Firstly, Weitzman (2000) overlooks that for a search fishery, nothing definite 
can be said about the choice between price and quantity regulation. Secondly, 
for schooling fisheries the demand function tends to be flat, while the marginal 
cost function tends to be steep. Therefore, taxes are likely to be preferred over 
ITQs. 
 
The pollution control literature on the choice between price and quantity regula-
tion is further discussed in section 2. In section 3 the model from Weitzman 
(1974) is developed for fisheries, while section 4 analyses conditions for the 




                                                                 
2  Others that have worked with the choice between price and quantity regulation under uncer-
tainty include Anderson (1986) and Androkovich and Stollery (1991). However, their approach 
differ from the approach taken in this paper (the Weitzman approach) with respect to the timing 
of decisions taken by the fishermen. In the Weitzman approach decisions is taken ex post (after 
the realisation of a random variable), while decisions is taken ex ante (before the realisation of 
a random variable) in Anderson (1986) and Androkovich and Stollery (1991). Furthermore, the 
two authors assume a very simple, linear growth function. Even with this growth function the 
solution becomes very complicated.  
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2. The pollution control literature 
Let us start by sketching the results in Weitzman (1974) for pollution. Weitz-
man reaches four main conclusions. Firstly, under full information it does not 
matter whether taxes or individual permits are used. Both instruments secure a 
first-best optimum. Secondly, an error in estimating the benefit function has ad-
verse effects on the welfare, but the welfare loss does not differ between price 
and quantity regulation. In other words it does not matter for the choice be-
tween taxes and transferable permits  if there is imperfect information about 
benefits. Thirdly, if there is uncertainty about costs, price regulation is preferred 
over quantity regulation if the marginal costs are steeper than the marginal 
benefit function. Fourthly, transferable permits are preferred over taxes in the 
case of imperfect information about costs if the marginal benefit function is 
steeper than the marginal cost function. 
 
Indeed, Weitzman (1974) arrives at the following formula for the choice be-
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  ￿ is the relative advantage of price over quantity regulation measured in 
terms of welfare. If  ￿> 0 price regulation is preferred over quantity regula-
tion while  ￿< 0 implies that quantity regulation is preferred over price 
regulation. 
 
2 s  is the variance of the error in marginal costs. 
  C´´ is the slope of a linear marginal cost function (the curvature of the total 
cost function). It is assumed that C´´ > 0. 
  B´´ is the slope of a linear marginal benefit function (the curvature of the 
benefit function). It is assumed that B´´ < 0. 
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An interpretation of (1) is given in section 4 where conditions for generalising 
the Weitzman results for fisheries are discussed. 
Some recent research extends the work by Weitzman (1974) to a dynamic set-
ting.
3 Baldurson and Fehr (1997) show that an assumption about irreversibility 
investments in new technology improves the performance of taxes. Neverthe-
less, irreversible decisions do not fundamentally change Weitzman's results. 
Hoel and Karp (1997) consider the case where environmental damage depends 
on the stock of pollution. As in Weitzman (1974) the curvature of cost and 
benefit functions is important. However, now the discount rate, the stock’s de-
cay rate, and society’s ability to make adjustments will also influence the 
choice between price and quantity regulation under imperfect information. 
Newell and Pizer (2000) present a similar model, where the damage depends on 
the stock of pollution. As in Hoel and Karp (1997) the curvature of cost and 
benefit functions is important. However, adjustments must be made for the cor-
relations of cost shocks across time, discounting, the stock decay rate and the 
rate of benefit growth. 
 
It could be argued that the analysis in this paper should depart from the work of 
Hoel and Karp (1997) and Newell and Pizer (2000), instead of Weitzman 
(1974), since these articles consider the case where stock effects are included. 
However, Newell and Pizer (2000) and Hoel and Karp (1997) assume that the 
cost function is related to the flow of pollution, while the benefit function is re-
lated to the stock of pollution. In other words the following problem is set up: 
 
                                                                 
3  Subsequent work on the issue of price versus quantity regulation in the 70s mostly departs from 
Weitzman (1974). Ireland (1977) argues that instead of a single price, an ideal price schedule 
should be considered. This ideal price should be a schedule contingent on the realised state of 
the world (a contingent message). Indeed, much work in the pollution control literature focuses 
on such a message, since a principal-agent approach is applied; see for example Jebjerg and 
Lando (1997). However, a contingent schedule is a complicated procedure, and the second-best 
problem of choosing between a single price and quantity in discussions of practical regulation 
is clearly relevant. Yohe (1978) extends Weitzman's analysis, so that quantity regulation does 
not automatically yield the output chosen under quantity regulation. In other words output is 
governed by a random variable. The choice between price and quantity regulation still depends 
on the curvature of cost and benefit functions, but additionally the relative size of variances un-
der the two types of regulation influence the choice between them.   
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  x & is the development in the stock of pollution over time. 
  x is the stock of pollution. 
  q is the emission reduction (pollution). 
  B(x) is the benefit of pollution (the environmental  damage that can be 
avoided by reducing emission). 
  F(q) is a function relating the stock of pollution to the flow of pollution. 
  lis the discount rate. 
  t is time. 
  C(q) is the cost of pollution. 
 
Even though the structure of the fisheries problem is the same, costs are related 
to both the stock and flow variables for a search fishery (C(q, x) where x is the 
fisheries stock and q is catches), while benefits are related to the flow variable 
(the benefits are the total revenue and B(q)). For a schooling fishery benefits 
and costs are only related to the flow variables (C(q) and B(q)). This explains 
why the Weitzman results do not apply to the case of a search fishery, but only 
to a schooling fishery. Furthermore, it is useful to depart directly from Weitz-
man (1974), because the purpose of this paper is to analyse conditions for gen-
eralising the Weitzman result. Therefore, a Weitzman model is now developed 
for the fisheries. 
3. A Weitzman model for fisheries 
Assume that the fishing fleet is homogeneous and that entry and exit to the in-
dustry can be excluded. The basic welfare economic problem that arises is that 
each individual fisherman disregards the effect that catches has on the stock  
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size (the resource restriction is excluded from the m aximisation problem). This 
corresponds to perfect competition. In order to correct this market failure soci-
ety faces two opportunities if a first-best solution is to be obtained under full 
information. Firstly, it can set a total quota and allocate the quota to the fisher-
men by means of a system of ITQs.
4 Secondly, it can tax catches.
5 Since fish-
ermen are homogeneous this amounts to selecting a uniform price on harvest.
6  
 
Let q be the aggregated catches from a fishery and let x be the stock size. Fur-
thermore, let C(q, x) be the cost function and B(q) the benefit of catches (the 
total revenue). B(q) – C(q, x) is the long-run economic yield and this economic 
yield is maximised.
7 The following assumptions are made with regard to the 
cost and benefit functions: 
 
•  Marginal benefits are non-increasing. (Bqq(q) < 0, where the subscript de-
notes partial derivatives).
8 A normal assumption within fisheries is that 
prices are constant such that Bqq(q) = 0. Empirical analysis (for example 
Arnason et al (2000)) confirms the assumption of constant prices. In sec-
tion 4 the implication of Bqq(q) = 0 is discussed, but in order to keep the 
analysis as general as possible, it is assumed that Bqq(q ) < 0. 
 
•  For any stock size, marginal costs are increasing in catches (Cqq(q, x) > 
0). Empirical analysis (for example Arnason et al (2000)) confirms this 
result. 
 
                                                                 
4  This solution requires perfectly functioning markets for ITQs. 
5  With perfect information this is equivalent to taxing fisheries effort. 
6  Clearly, the information requirements of such a system are large. 
7  Discounting is disregarded by maximisation of long-run economic yield. Even though it is cus-
tomary to include discounting in treatments of fisheries (see for example Conrad and Clark 
(1991) it is excluded in this paper. This is explained by the fact that the purpose of this paper is 
to analyse conditions for generalising the results in Weitzman (1974). Therefore, the simplest 
possible model is selected. However, incorporating discounting is a promising future research 
area. 
8  In order to keep the analysis as general as possible it is useful to change notation and let sub-
scripts denote partial derivatives. The reason for this is that the general model allows for non-
linear marginal costs and benefits, while the derivation of ￿section 4 approximates the mar-
ginal costs and benefits functions with linear curves.  
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•  The costs of catches do not rise in stock size. In other words it is not more 
expensive to catch from a larger stock than from a smaller stock (Cx(q, x) 
< 0). 
 
•  It is always profitable to catch some of the stock (Bq(0) > Cq(0, x)). 
 
•  Above some catch level the marginal benefits are lower than the marginal 
costs (Bq(q) < Cq(q, x) for q > q*)  
 
These assumptions secure that an optimum is reached. Under full information 
the maximization problem for society is to find q* and x* such that: 
 
)) x , q ( C ) q ( B ( Max -
  (4) 
s.t. 
 
0 q ) x ( F = -   (5) 
 
where F(x) is the natural growth. One implication of (5) is that the interest is in 
a steady-state equilibrium, where the natural growth is equal to catches.
9 
 
On the basis of (4) and (5) a Lagrange function can be set up. Call the optimal 
solutions q*, x* and l*, where l > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier and a measure of 
the marginal user costs of the fisheries stock. The first order condition for 
catches satisfies: 
 
0 * *) x *, q ( C *) q ( B q q = l - -   (6) 
 
                                                                 
9  With the assumed non-linearity of the objective function a gradual adjustment toward steady 
state is optimal. Here a feed-back rule can be used and a promising research path is to be found 
in Sandal and Steinshamn (1997), since their approach makes it easy to calculate q*. In this pa-
per the focus is on steady-state equilibrium since this is the simplest possible assumption. How-
ever, studies of choices between regulatory instruments under gradual adjustment toward equi-
librium is a promising future research area.  
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(6) says that society selects catches where marginal benefits (Bq(q*)) equal 
marginal social costs (Cq(q*, x*) + l*).  
 
Now something can be said about the choice between price and quantity regula-
tion. Call the optimal price of catches p* and set this price such that: 
 
l + = = *) x *, q ( C *) q ( B * p q q   (7) 
 
(7) expresses that society selects the optimal price such that it equals the mar-
ginal social cost and now it makes no difference whether society announces the 
optimal catches or price. With perfect information both price and quantity regu-
lation secures a first-best optimum. This result is also shown in for example 
Moloney and Pearse (1979). 
 
One reason for the break down of the equivalence between price and quantity 
regulation can be asymmetric information between society and the fishermen. 
Assume therefore that society has imperfect information about costs. Formally, 
this may be written as  ) , x , q ( C q , where q is a random variable which measures 
the  information gap. In other words  q captures that society is not as well in-
formed about the fishermen’s costs as the fishermen themselves. Assume also 
that a random variable, m, governs the benefit function such that ) , q ( B m . Again m 
measures an information gap and as above m captures that society is not as well 
informed about the benefit from the fishery as the fishermen.
10 
 
When selecting the optimal quantity or price, society maximises expected social 
welfare. It is necessary to choose prices and catches before m and q is known. 
This corresponds to the ex ante solution. The actual welfare loss is determined 
after  q and m is known. When  q and m can be observed an ex post situation 
arises. 
 
First, quantity regulation is discussed. The optimal quantity instrument under 
imperfect information about cost and benefits is the quantity that maximises: 
                                                                 
10  For the purpose in this section it is not necessary to describe the properties of q and m.  
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0 q ) x ( F = -   (9) 
 
where E is an expectation operator. Again a Lagrange function can be set up. 
Call the solutions to these conditions l ˆ   and   x ˆ   ,   q ˆ . The first-order condition for 
catches satisfies: 
 
) ˆ ) , x ˆ , q ˆ ( C ( E )) , q ˆ ( B ( E q q l + q = m   (10) 
 
In analogy with full information, expected marginal benefits equal expected 
marginal social costs for  q ˆ . Note that (10) corresponds to an ex ante selection 
of a quantity. 
 
Now consider price regulation. Since the price is selected such that an ex ante 
social optimum occurs, fishermen’s catches will respond to prices. The supply 
response function, ) , p ( h q q = , expresses that, and can be found from the fisher-
men’s maximisation problems. q is included in h(p, q) because it is the supply 
response function as perceived by society that is of interest. Since the fishermen 
are homogenous, it is enough to let one fisherman select aggregate catches. As 
previously mentioned, the problem is that the fishermen disregard the resource 
restriction, so the fisherman’s maximisation problem may be written as:  
 
)) , x ), , p ( h ( C ) , p ( ph ( Max q q - q   (11) 
 
The first order condition for h(p, q) is: 
 
) , x ), , p ( h ( C p h q q =   (12) 
 
The interpretation of (12) is that marginal benefit (p) equals marginal costs 
(Ch(h(p, q), x,q)).  
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Now the interest is in finding the optimal ex ante solution for price regulation 
given the fishermen’s response function (h(p, q)). Call these  x ~   and   ~ ,   p ~ l . Society 
will choose the variables according to the following maximisation problem: 
 




0 ) , p ( h ) x ( F = q -   (14) 
 
The first order condition for the price satisfies: 
 
)) , p ~ ( h
~
) , p ~ ( h ) , x ~ ), , p ~ ( h ( C ( E )) , p ~ ( h ) ), , p ~ ( h ( B ( E p p h p h q l + q q q = q m q   (15) 
 
) , p ~ ( h p q  is the response of catches to a marginal change in prices, and (15) ex-
presses that the expected benefit from a marginal change in price 
( ))) , p ~ ( h ) ), , p ~ ( h ( B ( E p h q m q  must be equal to the expected social cost of a marginal 
price change ( ))) , p ~ ( h ˆ ) , p ~ ( h ) , x ~ ), , p ~ ( h ( C ( E p p h q l + q q q . (12) may be rearranged to find 
the optimal ex ante price,  p ~ . From (12) it is obtained that  ). , x ~ ), , p ~ ( h ( C p ~
h q q =  By 
inserting this into (15), and rearranging it is obtained that: 
 
)) , p ~ ( h ( E
)) , p ~ ( h )
~





q l - m q
=   (16) 
 
The optimal ex ante price is therefore the expected benefit minus the user costs 
of a marginal price change, divided by the expected response of catches to a 
marginal price change. Corresponding to an ex ante optimal price is an ex post 
catch level, which may be found as ) , p ~ ( h ) ( q ~ q = q .  
 
Even though both the quantity and price regulations analysed above yield an 
optimum ex ante, none of the instruments probably yield an optimum ex post, 
since in all likelihood it will be the case that  l + q „ m ˆ ) , x ˆ , q ˆ ( C ) , q ˆ ( B q q  and  
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l + q q „ m q
~
) , x ~ ), ( q ~ ( C ) ), ( q ~ ( B q q . The relevant question is therefore which regulatory 
instrument secures the highest welfare ex post. This is the question to which 
attention is now turned. 
4. Conditions for the Weitzman result to hold 
Now the comparative advantage of prices over quantities can be defined as the 
total net benefit under price regulation minus the total net benefit under quantity 
regulation: 
 
))) , x ˆ , q ˆ ( C ) , q ˆ ( B ( ) , x ~ ), ( q ~ ( C ) ), ( q ~ ( B ( E q - m - q q - m q = ￿   (17) 
 
If  ￿ > 0, price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation, because the net 
benefits associated with quantity regulation are smaller than those of price regu-
lation. ￿ < 0 implies that quantity regulation is preferred over price regulation. 
 
Assume first that the fishery is a schooling fishery. In this case stock effects do 
not matter on the cost side, so C(q, q). In order to say something about (17), 
more structure on the problem is necessary. Therefore, a second order Taylor 
approximation of costs and benefits is used. In this formulation cost and bene-
fits vary within the range of the optimal catch under price regulation around the 
optimal catch under quantity control. In other words the costs and benefits un-
der price regulation is measured in relation to the costs and benefits under quan-
tity regulation. Let » denote a local approximation. Then: 
 
2 ) q ˆ q (
2
´´ C
) q ˆ q ))( ( ´ C ( ) ( a ) , q ( C - + - q a + + q » q   (18) 
 
2 ) q ˆ q (
2
´´ B
) q ˆ q ))( ( ´ B ( ) ( b ) , q ( B - + - m b + + m » m   (19) 
 
Five assumptions and observations are worth mentioning with respect to cost 
and benefit functions. Firstly, a(q) and b(m) translate different values of m and q 
into pure vertical shifts of the cost and benefit functions. Furthermore,  
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) , q ˆ ( C ) ( a q = q  and ) , q ˆ ( B ) ( b m = m . In other words, a(q) corresponds to the total cost of 
catches under quantity control and b(m) the total benefit under quantity control. 
From this fact it follows that it is enough to concentrate on finding the optimal 
catches under price regulation. Secondly, it is assumed that a(q) and b(m) is 
standardised and independently distributed. This implies that 0 )) ( ( E )) ( ( E = m b = q a  
and  0 )) ( ) ( ( E = m b q a . Thirdly, the marginal costs and marginal benefits may be 
found. Differentiating (18) and (19) yields: 
 
) q ˆ q ´´( C ) ( ´ C ) , q ( Cq - + q a + » q   (20) 
 
) q ˆ q ´´( B ) ( ´ B ) , q ( Bq - + m b + » m   (21) 
 
Fourthly, the fixed coefficients in (18) and (19) can be analysed. Since  q ˆ ) q ( E =  
and  0 )) ( ( E )) ( ( E = q b = q a , )) , q ( C ( E ´ C q q » and )) , q ( B ( E ´ B q m » . Therefore, C´ is the ex-
pected marginal cost of catches and B´ is the expected marginal benefit. Fur-
thermore  ) , q ( C ´´ C qq q »  and  ) , q ( B ´´ B qq m »  (C´´ is the curvature of the cost function 
and B´´ is the curvature of the benefit function). From the assumptions in sec-
tion 3 it follows that B´´< 0 < C´´. Lastly, the implication of the assumed cost 
and benefit f unctions are that  a(q) and b(m) represent pure unbiased shifts in 
the marginal costs and benefit functions. The variances are by definition the 
mean square of errors in marginal costs and benefits: 
 
) ) ( ( E )) , q ( C ( E ) , q ( C ( E
2
q q
2 q a » q - q = s   (22) 
 
) ) ( ( E )) , q ( B ( E )) , q ( B ( E
2
q q
2 m b » m - m = p   (23) 
 
Now ￿ can be calculated. In the appendix it is shown that: 
 







= ￿   (24) 
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It is seen that (24) is exactly the same formula as expressed in (1). So for a 
schooling fishery there is nothing wrong with quoting Weitzman's results. Five 
conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, imperfect information about benefits does 
not enter in (24). The reason is that with a second order approximation it affects 
price and quantity regulation equally.
11 Secondly,￿ depends linearly on s
2. As 
s
2 -> 0 the perfect information case is arrived at, while increasing s
2 magnifies 
the e xpected loss of employing a regulatory instrument. Thirdly,￿ depends 
critically on the curvature of the costs and benefit functions. The sign of ￿ is 
simply the sign of  C´´ + B´´. Fourthly, quantity regulation is preferred if the 
benefit function is sharply curved and the cost function is close to linear. In 
these cases the coefficient of ￿ is negative. Fifthly, when the benefit function is 
close to linear, price regulation is preferred. In this case ￿ is large and positive.  
 
For fisheries without stock effects on the cost side, constant prices and positive 
marginal costs, price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation if society 
is unsure about marginal costs. As mentioned in the introduction these proper-
ties characterise a schooling fishery, and among schooling fisheries the herring 
fishery in Iceland is managed by ITQs. This fact is surprising in the light of the 
analysis in this paper. Furthermore, the statement by Weitzman (2000) on eco-
nomic uncertainty, presented in the introduction, is imprecise for a schooling 
fishery. The reason for this is that Weitzman is unaware of the actual magnitude 
of the slope of the marginal profit function. 
 
Assume instead that the fishery is a search fishery. Assume also that the cost 
function is additively separable such that  ) x ( C ) , q ( C ) , x , q ( C + q = q  and that C xx = 
0.
12 A second order approximation around q ˆ and x ˆ yields: 
                                                                 
11  A similar conclusion is mentioned in Andersen (1982). Andersen (1982) analyse price uncer-
tainty and shows that a tax on catch and ITQs yields the same results. 
12  The assumption that Cxx = 0 is by no means critical. Assume instead that Cxx > 0. In this case a 
second order approximation around q ˆ and  x ˆ gives the result that: 
2 2 ) x ˆ x (
2
´´
) x ˆ x ´( ) q ˆ q (
2
´´ C
) q ˆ q ))( ( ´ C ( ) ( a ) , x , q ( C -
h
- - h - - + - q a + + q » q  
  where  ´ h is the marginal cost reduction associated with increased stock size and  ´´ h is the curva-
ture of the stock cost function. Now:  
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) x ˆ x ( ) q ˆ q (
2
´´ C
) q ˆ q ))( ( ´ C ( ) ( a ) , x , q ( C
2 - h - - + - q a + + q » q   (25) 
 
where  his the marginal cost reduction associated with stock size. Retaining all 
the assumptions and notation from above it is in appendix shown that: 
 
) x ˆ x ~ (









= ￿   (26) 
 
The only difference between this formula and (1) is that the difference in cost 
reduction due to increased stock sizes is reflected in the formula. Therefore, if 
the cost function is additively separable in stock size and catches there is noth-
ing wrong with quoting the analysis by Weitzman (1974) for a search fishery, 
and an additively separable cost function is a sufficient condition for generalis-
ing the Weitzman result for fisheries. Indeed, a schooling fishery also corre-
sponds to a case where the cost function is additively separable in stock size 
and catches, but it is a special case because 0 = h .  
 
However, for a search fishery the cost function is not additively separable in 
stock size and catches and the second order approximation around q ˆ and x ˆ of the 
cost function becomes complex, because cross partial derivatives (Cxq(q, x, q)) 
and interactive terms ( )) q ˆ q )( x ˆ x ( - - are included.
13 In order to say something 
more about this case assume that F(x) is given by a second-order approximation 
around  x ˆ.
14 Now the optimal quantity and stock size under price regulation may 
be found by solving four equations in four unknowns,
15 and the expression for 
￿becomes so complex that it is impossible to say anything about the choice be-
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= ￿  
  and the Weitzman results generalise as in the case where h´´ = 0. 
13  See Williamson et al (1972) for the formula of a second order Taylor approximation in two 
variables. 
14  A second-order approximation must be logical, because such an approximation is conducted on 
the cost and benefit functions.  




tween price and quantity regulation under imperfect information.
16 Indeed, 
multiplicative terms between the slope of the marginal cost function and the pa-
rameters in the natural growth are included in  ￿, and there is no easy way to 
extend the analysis of Weitzman to a search fishery. 
 
This conclusion can be related to the models in Hoel and Karp (1997) and 
Newell and Pizer (2000). These authors describe, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the case where the benefit of pollution depends on the stock of pollution. 
However, the costs only depend on the flow of pollution. In such a model it is 
possible to generalise the Weitzman results. The reason for this is that the arti-
cles are in effect describing a schooling fishery, since the cost effect of the 
stock is zero.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper prices versus quantities for common pool resources have been ana-
lysed. The analysis shows that a sufficient condition for generalising Weitz-
man's analysis for fisheries is that the cost function is additively separable in 
stock size and catches. For this reason it is therefore not right to quote Weitz-
man (1974) in connection with analysis of fisheries management for a search 
fishery, as done in Clark (1985). A further result is related to schooling fisher-
ies. Here it is shown that it is likely that taxes are preferred over ITQs. There-
fore, the application of ITQs for the herring fishery in Iceland is surprising. 
 
These conclusions are shown with two simplifying assumptions. Firstly, a 
steady-state equilibrium model is developed. Secondly, long-run economic 
yield is maximised. Promising areas for future research is to study the choice 
between price and quantity regulation with the inclusion of a discount rate and 
an adjustment process toward equilibrium. 
                                                                 
16  This conclusion may also be seen from the analysis in Anderson (1986). As mentioned above 
Anderson (1986) assumes that the fishermen take decisions before the random variable is real-
ized. Furthermore, the growth function is linear. Even with these simplifying assumptions, the 




Even though the analysis in this paper shows that taxes are preferred over ITQs 
for common pool resources without stock effects on the cost side, other argu-
ments can be put forward in favour of ITQs. For example, it can be argued that 
ITQs have the property that the fishermen collect the resource rent, while soci-
ety collects the resource rent with taxes. In other words distributional arguments 
can lead to a recommendation of ITQs. However, even if this argument is ac-
cepted as correct, the analysis in this paper shows that efficiency can be one ar-
gument for preferring taxes.  
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Appendix 
For both schooling fisheries and search fisheries with additive separable cost 
functions the proof is the same. In order to find ￿ an expression for  ) , p ~ ( h q must 
be found. From the fishermen’s maximization problem under price regulation it 
follows that: 
 
) q ˆ q ´´( C ) ( ´ C p ˆ - + q a + =   (1) 
 
(1) implies that: 
 
´´ C
) ( ´ C p
q ˆ ) , p ~ ( h
q a - -
+ = q   (2) 
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Inserting (2) in the definition of the benefit function, taking the expectations 
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´ B p ~ l -
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From the first order condition for society under price regulation B´= C´+  ) ~ ( E l . 




´) C p ~ (
´´ B ´ C p ~ -
+ =   (6) 
 
Because B´´ < 0 < C´´, it follows that: 
 
´ C p ~ =   (7) 
 




q ˆ ) , p ( h
q a
- = q   (8) 
 
Inserting (8) in the expression for the comparative advantage yields the expres-
sion in the text.   
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